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Socrates or Muhammad?
Joseph Ratzinger on the Destiny of Reason
by

Mr. Lee Harris
Mr. Harris is the author of Civilization and Its Enemies. His new book, The
Suicide of Reason, is to be published this year. This article is devoted to the
memory of Oriana F allaci.

On September 12, Pope Benedict XVI delivered an astonishing speech at
the University of Regensburg. Entitled "Faith, Reason, and the
University," it has been widely discussed, but far less widely understood.
The New York Times, for example, headlined its article on the Regensburg
address, "The Pope Assails Secularism, with a Note on Jihad." The word
"secularism" does not appear in the speech, nor does the pope assail or
attack modernity or the Enlightenment. He states quite clearly that he is
attempting "a critique of modem reason from within," and he notes that
this project "has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time
before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modem age. The
positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly."
Benedict, in short, is not issuing a contemporary Syllabus of Errors.
Instead, he is asking those in the West who "share the responsibility for the
right use of reason" to return to the kind of self-critical examination of their
own beliefs Lhat was the hallmark of ancient Greek thought at its best. The
spirit that animates Benedict's address is not the spirit of Pius IX; it is the
spirit of Socrates. Benedict is inviting all of us to ask ourselves, Do we
really know what we are talking about when we talk about faith, reason,
God, and community?
For many, it will seem paradoxical that the Roman pontiff has
invoked the critical spirit of Socrates. The pope, after all, is the
embodiment of the traditional authority of the Church, and the Church is
supposed to have all the answers. Yet Socrates was famous as the man who
had all the questions. Far from making any claims to infallibility, Socrates
argued that the unexamined life was not worth living, and he was prepared
to die rather than cease the process of critical self-examination. Socrates
even refused to call himself wise, arguing instead that he only deserved to
be called a "lover of wisdom."
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Socrates skillfully employed paradox as a way to get people to think,
yet even he might have been puzzled by the paradox of a Roman Catholic
pope who is asking for a return to Socratic doubt and self-critique.
Benedict must be perfectly aware of this paradox himself, so that we must
assume that he, too, is using paradox deliberately, as Socrates did, and for
the same reason: to startle his listeners into rethinking what they thought
they already knew.
But why should Pope Benedict XVI feel the need at this moment in
history to emphasize and highlight the role that Greek philosophical
inquiry played in "the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe"?
Christian Europe, after all, was a fusion of diverse elements: the Hebrew
tradition, the experience of the early Christian community, the Roman
genius for law, order, and hierarchy, the Germanic barbarians' love of
freedom, among many others. In this cultural amalgam, Greek philosophy
certainly played a role, yet its contribution was controversial from the
beginning. In the second century A.D., the eminent Christian theologian
Tertullian, who had been trained as a Roman lawyer, asked
contemptuously: "What does Athens have to do with Je1usalem?" For
Tertullian,Athens represented hot air and wild speculation. Many others in
the early Church agreed, among them those who burned the writings of the
most brilliant of all Greek theologians, Origen. Yet Benedict's address can
be understood as a return to the position of the man who taught Origen, the
vastly erudite St. Clement of Alexandria.
St. Clement argued that Greek philosophy had been given by God to
mankind as a second source of tmth, comparable to the Hebrew revelation.
For St. Clement, Socrates and Plato were not pagan thinkers: they
prefigured Christianity. Contrary to what Tertullian believed, Christianity
needed more than just Jerusalem: It needed Athens too. Pope Benedict in
his address makes a strikingly similar claim: "The encounter between the
Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance." This
encounter, for Benedict, was providential, just as it had been for St.
Clement. Furthermore, Benedict argues that the "inner rapprochement
between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of
decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of
religions, but also from that of world history." For Benedict, however, this
event is not mere ancient history. It is a legacy that we in the West are all
duty-bound to keep alive, yet it is a legacy that is under attack, both from
those who do not share it, namely Islam, and from those who are its
beneficiaries and do not understand it, namely, Western intellectuals.
Let us begin by taking seriously Benedict's claim that in his address
he is attempting to sketch, in a rough outline, "a critique of modern reason
from within," He is not using his authority as the Roman pontiff to attack
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77

i

modem reason from the point of view of the Church. His approach is not
dogmatic; it is dialectical. He stands before his leamed audience not as the
pope. but simply as Joseph Ratzinger, an intelligent and thoughtful man,
who makes no claims to any privileged cognitive authority. He has come,
like Socrates, not to preach or sermonize, but to challenge with questions.
Ratzinger is troubled that most educated people today appear to
think that they know what they are talking about, even when they are
talking about very difficult things, like reason and faith. Reason, they
thiiLk, is modem reason. But, as Ratzinger notes, modem reason is a far
more limited and nanow concept than the Greek notion of reason. The
Greeks felt that they could reason about anything and everything - about
the immortality ofthe soul, metempsychosis, the nature of God, the role of
reason in the universe, and so on. Modem reason, from the time of Kant,
has repudiated this kind of wild speculative reason. For modem reason,
there is no point in even asking such questions, because there is no way of
answering them scientifically. Modem reason, after Kant, became
identified with what modern science does. Modem science uses
mathematics and the empirical method to discover truths about which we
can all be certain: Such truths are called scientific truths. It is the business
of modern reason to severely limit its activity to the discovery of such
truths, and to refrain from pure speculation.
Ratzinger, it must be stressed, has no trouble with the truths revealed
by modern science. He welcomes them. He has no argument with Darwin
or Einstein or Heisenberg. What disturbs him is the assumption that
scientific reason is the only form of reason, and that whatever is not
scientifically provable lies outside the universe of reason. According to
Ratzinger, the results of this "modem self-limitation of reason" are
twofold. First, "the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology,
and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity."
Second, "by its very nature (the scientific) method excludes the question of
God, making it appear an unscientific or prescientific question."
In making this last point about God, it may appear that Joseph
Ratzinger, the critical thinker, has switched back into being Pope Benedict
XVI, the upholder of Christian orthodoxy. Defenders of modern reason
and modem science can simply shrug off his objection to their exclusion of
God by saying, "Of course, the question of God cannot be answered by
science. This was the whole point of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
Science can neither prove, nor disprove God's existence. Furthermore, by
bringing in the question of God, you have violated your own ground rules.
You claimed to be offering a critique of modem reason from within, but by
dragging God into the discussion, you are criticizing modern reason from
the standpoint of a committed Christian. You are merely saying that
modern reason excludes God; we who subscribe to the concept of modem
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reason are perfectly aware of this fact. Maybe it troubles you, as
Christian, but it doesn't bother us in the least."
Can Joseph Ratzinger, the critical thin..ker, answer this objection?
Yes, he can, and he does. His answer is provided by his discussion of jihad.
Contrm:y to what the New York Times reported, Ratzinger is not providing
merely "a note on jihad" that has no real bearing on the central message o
his address. According to his own words, the topic of jihad constitutes "thei
starting-point" for his reflection on faith and reason. Ratzinger uses the\
Islamic concept of jihad to elucidate his critique of modem reason from!
within.
Modem reason argues that questions of ethics, of religion, and of:
God are outside its compass. Because there is no scientific method by'
which such questions can be answered, modem reason cannot concern:
itself with them, nor should it try to. From the point of view of modem',
reason, all religious faiths are equally inational, all systems of ethics,
equally unverifiable, all concepts of God equally beyond rational criticism.
But if this is the case, then what can modem reason say when it is
confronted by a God who commands that his followers should use violence·
and even the threat of death in order to convert unbelievers?
If modern reason cannot concern itself with the question of God,
then it cannot argue that a God who commands jihad is better or worse than
a God who commands us not to use violence to impose our religious views
on others. To the modem atheist, both Gods are equally figments of the
imagination, in which case it would be ludicrous to discuss their relative
merits. The proponent of modem reason, therefore, could not possibly
think of participating in a dialogue on whether Christianity or Islam is the
more reasonable religion, since, for him, the very notion of a "reasonable
religion" is a contradiction in terms.
Ratzinger wishes to challenge this notion, not from the point of view
of a committed Cluistian, but from the point of view of modem reason
itself. He does this by calling his educated listeners' attention to a
"dialogue carried on- perhaps in 1391 in the winter banacks near Ankara
-by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated
Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both." In
particular, Ratzinger focuses on a passage in the dialogue where the
emperor "addresses his interlocutor with a sta_rtling brusqneness" on the
"central question about the relationship between religion and violence in :
general, saying: 'Show me just what Mohanuned brought that was new,
and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command
to spread by the sword the faith he preached."'
Ratzinger's daring use of this provocative quotation was not
designed to inflame Mnslims. He was using the emperor's question in
order to offer a profound challenge to modem reason from within. Can
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79

modern reason really stand on the sidelines of a clash between a religion
that commands jihad and a religion that forbids violent conversion? Can a
committed atheist avoid taking the side of Manuel II Paleologus when he
says: "God is not pleased by blood- and not acting reasonably is contrary
to God's nature ... Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability
to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats ... To
convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong ann, or weapons of
any kind, or any other means of tlu·eatening a person with death."
Modern science cannot tell us that the emperor is right in his
controversy with the learned Persian over what is or is not contrary to
God's nature. Modern reason proclaims such questions unanswerable by
science- and it is right to do so. But can modem reason hope to survive as
reason at all if it insists on reducing the domain of reasonable inquiry to the
sphere of scientific inquiry? If modern reason cannot take the side of the
emperor in this debate, if it cannot see that his religion is more reasonable
than the religion of those who preach and practice jihad, if it cannot
condemn as unreasonable a religion that forces atheists and unbelievers to
make a choice between their intellectual integJity and death, then modem
reason may be modem, but it has ceased to be reason.
The typical solution to the problem of ethics and religion offered by
modem reason is quite simple: Let the individual decide such matters
himself, by whatever means he wishes. If a person prefers Islam over
Christianity, or Jainism over Methodism, that is entirely up to him. All such
choices, from the perspective of modern reason, are equally leaps of faith,
or simply matters of taste; hence all are equally inational. Ratzinger
recognizes this supposed solution, but he sees the fatal weakness in it.
Modem reason asserts that questions of ethics and religion
... have no place within the purview of collective reason as
defmed by "science," ... and must thus be relegated to the realm of
the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his
experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and
the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is
ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to
create a conununity and become a completely personal matter.
This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from
the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which
necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of
religion and ethics no longer concern it.

If the individual is free to choose between violence and reason, it will
become impossible to create a community in which all the members
restJict themselves to using reason alone to obtain their objectives. If it is
left up to the individual to use violence or reason, then those whose
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subjective choice is for violence will inevitably destroy the community of
those whose subjective choice is for reason. Worse still, those whose
subjective choice is for violence do not need to constitute more than a
small percentage of the community in order to destroy the very possibility
of a community of reasonable men: Brute force and teJTor quickly
extinguish rational dialogue and debate.
Modern reason says that all ethical choices are subjective and
beyond the scope of reason. But if this is so, then a man who wishes to live
in a community made up of reasonable men is simply making a personal
subjective choice- a choice that is no more reasonable than the choice of
the man who wishes to live in a community governed by brute force. But if
the reasonable man is reasonable, he must recognize that modern reason
itself can only survive in a community made up of other reasonable men.
Since to be a reasonable man entails wishing to live in a community made
up of other reasonable men, then the reasonable man cannot afford to allow
the choice between reason and violence to be left up to mere personal taste
or intellectual caprice. To do so would be a betrayal of reason.
Modem reason, to be sure, cannot prove scientifically that a
community of reasonable men is ethically superior to a community
governed by violent men. But a critique of modem reason from within
must recognize that a community of reasonable men is a necessary
precondition of the very existence of modern reason. He who wills to
preserve and maintain the achievements of modern reason must also will to
live in a community made up of reasonable men who abstain from the use
of violence to enforce their own values and ideas. Such a community is the
a priori ethical foundation of modem reason. Thus, modem reason, despite
its claim that it can give no scientific advice about ethics and religion, must
recognize that its own existence and survival demand hath an ethical
postulate and a religious postulate. The ethical postulate is: Do whatever is
possible to create a community of reasonable men who abstain from
violence, and who prefer to use reason. The religious postulate is: If you
are given a choice between religions, always prefer the religion that is most
conducive to creating a community of reasonable men, even if you don't
believe in it yourself.
Modem reason cannot hope to prove these postulates to be
scientifically true; but it must recognize that a refusal to adopt and act on
these postulates will threaten the very survival of modem reason itself.
That is the point of Ratzinger's warning that "the West has long been
endangered by (its) aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality,
and can only suffer great harm thereby." Because it is ultimately a
community of reasonable men that underlies the rationality of the West,
modern reason is risking suicide by not squarely confronting the question:
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How did such a community of reasonable men come into being in the first
place? By what miracle did men tum from brute force and decide to reason
with one another"
It is important to stress that Ratzinger is not repudiating the critical
examination of reason that was initiated by Kant. Instead, he is urging us to
examine the cultural and historical conditions that made the emergence of
modern reason possible. Modem reason required a preexisting community
of reasonable men before it could emerge in the West; modem reason,
therefore, could not create the cultural and historical condition that made
its own existence possible. But in this case, modem reason must ask itself:
What created the communities of reasonable men that eventually made
modern reason possible?
This was the question taken up by one of Kant's most illustrious and
brilliant students, Johann Herder. Herder began by accepting Kant and the
Enlightenment, but he went on to ask the Kantian question: What were the
necessary conditions of the European Enlightenment? What kind of culture
was necessa..ry in order to produce a critical thinker like Immanuel Kant
himself? When Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, methodically
demolished all the traditional proofs for the existence of God, why wasn't
he tom limb from limb in the Streets ofKonigsburg by outraged believers,
instead of being hailed as one of the greatest philosophers of all time?
Herder's answer was that in Europe, and in Europe alone, human
beings had achieved what Herder called "cultures of reason." In his grand
and pioneering survey of world history and world cultures, Herder had
been struck by the fact that in the vast majority of human societies, reason
played little or no role. Men were governed either by a blind adherence to
tradition or by brute force. Only among the ancient Greeks did the ideal of
reason emerge to which Manuel II Paleologus appeals in his dialogue with
the learned Persian.
A culture of reason is one in which the ideal of the dialogue has
become the foundation of the entire community. In a culture of reason,
everyone has agreed to regard violence as an illegitimate method of
changing other people's minds. The only legitimate method of effecting
such change is to speak well and to reason properly. Furthermore, a culture
of reason is one that privileges the spirit of Greek philosophic inquiry: It
encourages men to think for themselves.
For Herder, modern scientific reason was the product of European
cultures of reason, but these rare cultures of reason were themselves the
outcome of a well-nigh miraculous convergence of traditions to which
Ratzinger has called our attention as constituting the foundation of Europe:
the world-histmical encounter between Biblical faith and Greek
philosophical inquiry, "with the subsequent addition of the Roman
heritage." Thus, for Herder, modern scientific and critical reason, if it looks
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scientifically and critically at itself, will be forced to recognize that it cm1'
never have come into existence had it not been for the "providential," c
perhaps merely serendipitous, convergence of these three great traditions.
Modern reason is a cultural phenomenon like any other: It did not drop
down one fine day out of the clouds. It involved no special creation.
Rather, it evolved uniquely out of the fusion of cultural traditions known as
Christendom.
A critique of modern reason from within must recognize its cultural
and historical roots in this Christian heritage. In particular, it must
recognize its debt to the distinctive concept of God that was the product of
the convergence of the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman traditions. To recognize
this debt, of course, does not require any of us to believe that this God
actually exists.
For example, the 19th century German philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer was an atheist; yet in his own critique of modem reason, he
makes a remarkably shrewd point, which Ratzinger might well have made
himself. Modem scientific reason says that the universe is governed by
mles through and through; indeed, it is the aim of modem reason to
disclose and reveal these laws through scientific inquiry. Yet, as
Schopenhauer asks, where did this notion of a law-governed universe
come from? No scientist can possibly argue that science has proven the
universe to be rule-governed throughout all of space and all of time. As
Kant argued in his Critique of Judgment, scientists must begin by
assuming that nature is rational through and through: It is a necessary
hypothesis for doing science at all. But where did thi:s hypothesis, so vital
to science, come from')
The answer, according to Schopenhauer, was that modem scientific
reason derived its model of the universe from the Ch1istian concept of God
as a rational Creator who has intelligently designed every last detail of the
universe ex nihilo. It was this Christian idea of God that permitted
Europeans to believe that the universe was a rational cosmos. Because
Europeans had been brought up to imagine the universe as the creation of a
rational intelligence, they naturally came to expect to find evidence of this
intelligence wherever they looked and, strangely enough, they did.
Ratzinger, in his address, draws our attention to the famous opening
passage of the Gospel of John, in which the Biblical God, the Creator of
the Universe, is identified with the Greek concept of logos, which means
both word and reason - "a reason which is creative and capable of selfcommunication, precisely as reason." Though Ratzinger does not mention
it, the Roman tradition also comes into play in this revolutionary new
concept of God: For the Christian God, like a good Roman emperor, is a
passionate lover of order, law, and hierarchy. He does not merely create a
universe through reason, but he subjects it thoroughly to laws, establishes
February, 2007
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order in every part of it, and organizes hierarchies that allow us to
comprehend it all: Our cat is a member of the species cat, the species cat
belongs to the order of mammals, all mammals are in tum animals, and all
animals are fmms of life. What Roman legion was ever better organized
than that?
For Schopenhauer, as an atheist, the rational Creator worshiped by
Christians was an imaginary construction, like all other gods. For
Ratzinger, as a Christian, this imaginary construction is an approximation
of the reality of God; but for Ratzinger, as a critical thinker, there is no need
to make this affirmation of faith. In offering his "critique of modern reason
from within," it is enough for his purposes to point out how radically
different this imaginary construction of God is from the competing
imaginary constructions of God offered by other religions - and, indeed,
from competing imaginary constructions of God offered by many thinkers
who fell clearly within the Christian tradition.
For example, Ratzinger notes that within the Catholic scholastic
tradition itself, thinkers emerged like Duns Scotus, whose imaginary
construction of God sundered the "synthesis between the Greek spirit and
the Christian spirit." For Scotus, it was quite possible that God "could have
done the opposite of everything he has actually done." If God had willed to
create a universe without rhyme or reason, a universe completely
unintelligible to human intelligence, that would have been his privilege. If
he had decided to issue commandments that enjoined human beings to
sacrifice their children, or kill their neighbors, or plunder their property,
mankind would have been compelled to obey such commandments. Nor
would we have had any "reason" to object to them, or even question them.
For Scotus and those who followed him, the ultimate and only reason
behind the universe is God's free and unrestrained will. But as Ratzinger
asks, How can such a view of God avoid leading "to the image of a
capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness?" The
answer is, it cannot.
Intimately connected with the concept of God as a rational Creator
who wishes for us to be able to understand the reason behind the universe
is the concept of a God who will behave reasonably toward us. He will not
be delighted when we grovel before him, nor will he demand that we
worship him in "fear and trembling." Instead, he will be a God who prefers
for us to feel reverence and gratitude towards him.
Ratzinger notes that Socrates' mission was to challenge and critique
the myths of the Greek gods that prevailed in his day. These gods were
imagined as behaving not only capriciously, but often wickedly and
bmtally The famous line from King Lear sums up this view: "As flies to
wanton boys are we to the gods -they kill us for their sport." But, asked
Socrates, were such gods worthy of being worshiped by reasonable men,
84

Linacre Quarterly

or by free men: Tme, we may feel abject terror before tbem; but should we
have reverence for them simply because they have the power to injure us?
In The Euthyphro, Socrates quotes a Greek poet, Stasinus, who, speaking
of Zeus, says "where fear is, there also is reverence," but only to disagree
with the poet's concept of God. "It does not seem to me true that where fear
is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and
other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things
which they fear." For Socrates, it was obvious that good was not whatever
God capriciously chose to do; the good was what God was compelled by
his very nature to do. Socrates would have agreed with the Byzantine
emperor when he said, "God is not pleased by blood, and not acting
reasonably is contrary to God's nature."
The Emperor Manuel II Paleologus pondered this question in his
debate with the learned Persian. How can a god who commands
conversion by the sword be the same god as the emperor's god- a god who
wished to gain converts only through the use of words and reason? If Allah
is happy to accept converts who are trembling in fear for their lives, with a
sword hovering over their necks, then he may well be a god worth fearing,
but not a god worth revering. He may represent an imaginary constrnction
of god suitable to slaves, but he will not be an image of god worthy of
being worshiped by a Socrates or by any reasonable man.
The New York Times expressed dismay that Pope Benedict XVI, by
quoting the words of Manuel II Paleogus, had betrayed the ecumenical
tradition of John Paul II, who insisted that all of us, including both
Christians and Muslims, worship the same God. Many others have joined
in the criticism of the Regensburg address; Ratzinger, in his role as the
Roman pontiff, has apologized if his remarks offended Muslim
sensibilities. Perhaps, as Pope Benedict, he was wise to do so. But
Ratzinger, the man ofreason, the critical thinker, owes no one an apology.
He spoke his mind, and he challenged his listeners and the world to ponder
questions that have haunted thoughtful men from the first age of Greek
philosophic inquiry. He has thrown out an immense challenge to modern
reason and to the modem world. Is it really a matter of subjective choice
whether men follow a religion that respects human reason and that refuses
to use violence to convert others~ Can even the most committed atheist be
completely indifferent to the imaginary gods that the other members of his
community continue to worship~ If modem reason cannot persuade men to
defend their own communities of reason against the eruption of "disturbing
pathologies of religion and reason," then what can persuade them to do so?
Human beings will have their gods - and modem reason cannot alter
this. Indeed, modem reason has produced its own ersatz god- a blind and
capricious universe into which accidental man has found himself
inexplicably thrown. It is a universe in which all human freedom is an
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illusion, because everything we do or think was detennined from the
moment of fhe Big Bang. It is a universe in which there is no mind at all,
but only matter, Yet without mind, how can there be reason? Without free
will, how can there be reasonable choices? Without reasonable choices,
how can there be reasonable men? Without reasonable men, how can there
be communities in which human dignity is defended from the indignity of
violence and brute force?
On his last day on earth, Socrates spent the hours before he drank the
fatal hemlock talking to his friends about the immortality of the human
soul. Next to Socrates was a Greek boy, whose name was Phaedo Ratzinger mentions him in his address. Socrates had come across Phaedo
one day in fhe marketplace of Athens, where he was up for sale as a slave.
Distraught at knowing what lay ahead for the handsome and intelligent
boy, Socrates ran to all his wealthy friends and collected enough money to
buy the boy, then immediately gave him his freedom. Socrates' liberation
ofPhaedo was a symbol of Socrates' earfhly mission.
Socrates hated the very fhought of slavery - slavery to ofher men,
slavery to mere opinions, slavery to fear, slavery to our own low desires,
slavery to our own high ambitions. He believed that reason could liberate
human beings from fhese various forms of slavery. Socrates would have
protested against the very thought of a God who was delighted by forced
conversions, or who was pleased when his worshipers proudly boasted that
they were his slaves. He would have fought against those who teach that
the universe is an uncaring thing, or who tell us that freedom is an illusion
and our mind a phantom. Ultimately, perhaps, Socrates would have seen
little to distinguish between those who bow down trembling before an
irrational god and those who resign themselves before an utterly indifferent
umverse.

In his moving and heroic speech, Joseph Ratzinger has chosen to
play the part of Socrates, not giving us dogmatic answers, but stinging us
with provocative questions. Shall we abandon the lofty and noble
conception of reason for which Socrates gave his life? Shall we delude
ourselves into thinking that the life of reason can survive without courage
and character? Shall we be content with lives we refuse to examine,
because such examination requires us to ask questions for which science
can give no definite answer? The destiny of reason will be determined by
how we in the modem West answer these questions.
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